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Cmi.PoRATIONs--"PERsoNAL INTEREST" OF DIRECTORS IN CoRPORATE TRANs-

ACTIONs--Serious dissension had developed between two factions of the seven:
member board of directors of defendant corporation. Group A, consisting of four
members, represented a working majority of the outstanding stock recently
acquired by a group of investors. Group B, consisting of three members, had
constituted the active management of the corporation for a number of years.
The resignation of group B was probable if group A continued to dominate the
board. It was proposed that stock of the defendant be exchanged for stock in
another corporation. Under the overall plan, group A was to resign and two
members of this group were to sell their stock in the defendant corporation at
a price one-third above the market price. Group B was to remain with the
corporation as officers and directors. This plan was approved unanimously by
the board, and was submitted in detail to a special meeting of the stockholders
who approved the plan by a vote of 14 to 1 (84% of the issued and outstanding
stock voting). Minority stockholders brought a derivative suit against the corporation and its officers to enjoin consummation of the plan. The district court
granted the injunction. On appeal, held, affirmed. The personal interest of the
directors in the plan was such as to deprive the stockholders of the unprejudiced
judgment to which they were entitled. Seagrwe Corp. v. Mount, Spain v.
Moimt, (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 389. .
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As a general proposition corporate directors are required to guide the activities of their corporation for the benefit of the stockholders. 1 To this end the
courts have been unanimous in declaring that directors are fiduciaries for their
corporation.2 It is also agreed that equity, at the option of the corporation, will
enjoin consummation of a transaction which involves a breach of the fiduciary
duty owed to the corporation.3 But conllict among the courts arises in attempting
to define what factual situations constitute a breach. The most troublesome
cases in this area are those in which a director has a "personal interest" in a
corporate transaction.4 In formulating the legal rules to be applied in each case,
protection of the interest of the stockholder in the corporation must be balanced
against freedom of corporate business activity. Where a corporate transaction
involving an "interested" director has been challenged in the past, the decisions
may be divided into four main groups. 5 First, those holding that a director is a
trustee with the corporation as the cestui que trust.6 Under this analogy any
corporate transaction involving a director is voidable at the option of the corporation. Second, those holding that transactions involving directors are not voidable if approved by an "uninterested" majority of the board.7 Third, those holding that in addition to approval by an "uninterested" majority of the board, the
transaction must be "fair" ( with the burden of proving fairness on the proponent of the transaction).8 Fourth, those holding that the "fairness" of the transaction is the only test. 9 Under the decisions in the first three groups, if approval
1 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Markovitz v.
Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A. (2d) 46 (1939); Dwyer v. Tracey, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 118 F.
Supp. 289; Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929); 3
FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §838 (1947); Dodd, "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Berle, "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees," 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1365 (1932).
2 Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E. (2d) 524 (1951); Paddock v.
Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W. (2d) 428 (1949); 20 lowA L. REv. 808 (1935); 3
FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §838 (1947). In addition the directors may be fiduciaries for the
stockholders, Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl Co., (W.Va. 1954) 81 S.E. (2d) 63; or for the
corporate creditors, Beach v. Williamson, 78 Fla. 611, 83 S. 860 (1919).
3 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309
(1931); 13 AM. JtIR., Corporations §§423, 451 (1938); 97 Am. St. Rep. 29 (1904); Dodd,
"Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?" 2
Umv. Cm. L. R.Ev. 194 (1935).
4 "Personal interest" of the director refers to the fact that the director will benefit
economically from the corporate transaction. The director's interest may be adverse to the
interest of the corporation or directly tied to the interest of the corporation. In either case
the director will not be able to give the "unprejudiced judgment" required by the court in
the principal case.
5 This grouping does not include decisions which were governed by state statutes.
6 Ashman v. Miller, (6th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 85; Berle, "Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust," 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931). Since a director does not have legal
title to corporate property, the term "quasi-trustee" is commonly used.
7 U.S. Rolling Stock Co. v. The Atlantic & G. W. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450 (1878);
Budd v. Walla Walla Printing & Publishing Co., 2 Wash. Terr. 347, 7 P. 896 (1885).
8 Cases are collected in BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS §72 (1946); 3 FLETCHER, CYc.
CoRP. §§935, 936 (1947). The majority of American courts today fall within this group.
o Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 S. (2d) 653 (1947); Monroe v. Scofield,
(10th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 725; Public Service Commission v. Indianapolis, 193 Ind.
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by an "uninterested" majority of the board is lacking, a minority stockholder is
able to block a transaction which may be mutually beneficial to the corporation
and the stockholders. Justification for this control by minority stockholders must
rest on the policy consideration which inspired the legal rules, i.e., protection
for the stockhold~rs. In the principal case the court found that the proposed
plan was not at variance with what sound business judgment would call for
under the circumstances. It also found that full disclosure of all material facts
concerning the plan had been made to the stockholders prior to the special
meeting.10 In the light of these findings, it is difficult to see what measure of
protection was afforded to the stockholders by the present decision.11 The fact
that a majority of the directors would personally benefit from the transaction
does not of itself indicate that the interest of the stockholders in the corporation
would suffer. Rigid adherence to such a rule may easily defeat the very purpose
of the rule. The result of many of the decisions within the .first three groups
above is to restrict freedom of corporate business activity with no corresponding
gain in protection for the stockholders. If, as in the fourth group of cases, the
court will review the "fairness" of the transaction, the fact that a majority of
the board of directors is personally interested becomes merely another factor to
be considered in determining the issue of "fairness."12 This approach to the
problem, together with the traditional legal sanctions against fraud and director's
secret profits, would achieve the desired results without unduly restricting
business freedom.
Richard R. Dailey

37, 137 N.E. 705 (1922). An inherent danger of this test is the use of ''hindsight" by
the court; for this reason it has been suggested that the standard should be "the reasonable
and uninterested director under the circumstances." 61 HAnv. L. REv. 335 (1948).
10 There is always the possibility of ratification of the transaction by the stockholders.
The court in the principal case rejects this idea because of the inHuence. of the majority
group of directors in the solicitation and use of the proxies.
11 From the language of the present opinion it is impossible to tell which of the
first three groups given above governed this decision.
12 In cases involving a contract between two corporations with common directors, a
majority of American courts do apply the "fairness" test. BAiiANTINE, CoRPORATIONS
§67 (1946).

